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THE RETURN OF THE WALTER TEST:
PATENTABILITY OF CLAIMS CONTAINING
MATHEMATICAL ALGORITHMS AFTER
IN RE GRAMS
For the past twenty years, the federal courts and the Patent
Trademark Office (PTO)I have struggled with the question of
whether claims in a patent application that include a mathematical
algorithm recite patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.2
Historically, courts have held that a mathematical algorithm is not
patentable subject matter because it is similar to a law of nature.
8
Thus, granting patent protection to a mathematical algorithm would
be like patenting a fundamental truth, such as Einstein's Theory of
Relativity.4 Nevertheless, courts generally have held that an applica-
tion of a mathematical algorithm to a known structure or process
may be patented if that algorithm exists in a particular relationship
with the other steps of the claim.5
Courts have labored to formulate a test for determining when a
claim, part of which is a mathematical algorithm, contains this rela-
tionship and thus recites patentable subject matter.6 For such a test
to be valid, it must provide not only correct and consistent results,
but also an objective and clear standard with which to reach these
results. The courts and the PTO currently use a test which fails to
successfully balance these concerns.
Part I of this Note examines what constitutes patentable subject
matter under section 101 and explains why courts typically do not
1 The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and the federal courts exist in a rela-
tionship specially created by the patent statute. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988). Initially,
all patent applications are submitted to the PTO for examination. A patent is issued to
an applicant only after the PTO determines that it meets substantive and procedural
statutory requirements. If the patent application is rejected by the PTO, the applicant
may appeal exclusively to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. If
a patent is granted by the PTO, the patent owner may subsequently enforce the patent
by bringing a suit for patent infringement in a United States district court. The fact that
the patent has already been reviewed and issued by the PTO does not prevent the defen-
dant in an infringement action from proving that the patent does not meet the require-
ments of the patent laws. However, the patent enjoys a presumption of validity.
EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETrrVE PRO-
CESS 771-72 (4th ed. 1989).
2 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) [hereinafter all references in text are to section 101].
* See infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
4 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
5 See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 43-168 and accompanying text.
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allow the patenting of inventions that consist only of mathematical
algorithms. Part II consists of four subparts which analyze how
courts have determined whether claims that include a mathematical
algorithm contain patentable subject matter. The first subpart re-
views how the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Gottschalk
v. Benson7 and Parker v. Flook8 set the framework for later methods of
analysis under section 101. The second subpart presents a two-step
test as formulated by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(CCPA)9 in Application of Walter.'0 The third subpart argues that the
United States Supreme Court has implicitly endorsed the Walter test.
The last subpart contrasts Walter with the CCPA's 1982 decision in
In re Abe& l and argues that the Abele court's relaxed reading of the
Walter test is inconsistent with the principles and rationales underly-
ing the Walter decision. Finally, Part III of this Note discusses the
section 101 analysis recently presented in In re Grams.12 The Note
argues that while the Grams court reinstated the Walter test to deter-
mine when a claim containing a mathematical algorithm is patenta-
ble, it should have gone further by declaring the Walter test also
dispositive of when such a claim is unpatentable.
I
ORIGINS OF PATENTABILrrY
A. Patentable Subject Matter Under Section 101
The statutory standards of patentability rest on a constitutional
grant of power. The United States Constitution states: "The Con-
gress shall have power... [t]o promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."' 3
7 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
8 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
9 The United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) was merged in
1982 with the United States Court of Claims to create the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit. The most significant new jurisdiction conferred upon the
Federal Circuit (in addition to the previous jurisdictions of the merging courts) is the
power to review the patent decisions of the district courts. The purpose of this new
jurisdiction is to lessen the burdens of the other circuit courts and to increase the uni-
formity of patent law. Because all patent appeals are decided by the Federal Circuit,
there are never conflicts with other circuits on issues of patent law. Consequently, the
Supreme Court rarely reviews a case involving patent law and decisions of the Federal
Circuit are usually the sole controlling precedents. E. KrrcH & H. PERLMAN, supra note
1, at 772.
10 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
11 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
12 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Patent law grants inventors the right to exclude
others from duplicating their patented invention for 17 years. ROBERT L. HARMON, PAT-
ENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 5 (1988).
1991] 963
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, Congress enacted the pat-
ent laws, which are incorporated in Title 35 of the United States
Code.' 4 Section 101 of this title establishes the categories of subject
matter into which inventions or discoveries must fall in order to
qualify for patent protection. 15 A court will deem an invention
"nonstatutory" or "unpatentable" subject matter if it does not fall
within one of these categories.'
6
The section 101 categories of patentable subject matter include
"any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."' 7 The
committee reports which accompanied the 1952 Patent Act1 8 indi-
cate that Congress intended statutory subject matter to "include
anything under the sun that is made by man." 19 Recognizing this
legislative intention, the Supreme Court has applied a broad
interpretation to statutory subject matter. 20 Thus, the Court has in-
14 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988). The Patent Act of 1952 is the most recent and com-
prehensive patent legislation. In creating the requirements of the 1952 Act, Congress
attempted to balance the traditional patent policy of encouraging inventors to develop
inventions that benefit society with the need for well-defined patent issuance guidelines
which promote orderly administration of the patent system. Note, The Poliy Implications
of Granting Patent Protection to Computer Software: An Economic Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REv.
147, 162 (1984) (authored byJeffrey S. Goodman).
15 Once an invention is deemed to be patentable subject matter under section 101,
it must then be examined for novelty and nonobviousness as required under sections
102 and 103, respectively. However, if an invention does not satisfy the requirements of
section 101, the invention is not patentable and the novelty and nonobviousness re-
quirements are not addressed. Stephen D. Kahn & Daniel A. DeVito, Patent Protection for
Computer Software, 1 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 7, 8 (June 1989).
16 The terms "nonstatutory" and "unpatentable" both mean that a claimed inven-
tion does not satisfy the requirements of section 101 and, therefore, is not patentable
subject matter. This Note will use these two terms interchangeably.
17 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Section 101 states three requirements for patentability:
the invention must be (1) new; (2) useful; and (3) statutory subject matter. However, the
question of whether a particular invention is new or novel is distinct from the question
of whether it is statutory subject matter. See Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961
(C.C.P.A. 1979). The novelty of an invention is considered only under section 102,
notwithstanding that this requirement is first mentioned in section 101. Id. see also Ap-
plication of Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1243 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (stating that the "point of
novelty" approach is inappropriate in determining whether a claimed invention is statu-
tory subject matter under section 101).
18 See supra note 14.
19 S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5; see H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 6, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2394, 2399.
20 See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PAT-
ENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE ch. 2106, at 2100-02 (Oct. 1987) (stating that the Supreme
Court in Diamond v. Diehr and Diamond v. Chakrabarty construed section 101 broadly). In
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), the Supreme Court determined that a
living man-made microorganism fell within the terms of "manufacture" or "composition
of matter" in section 101. As stated in Grams, "Chakrabarty expressly rejects the argu-
ment that patentability in a new area, 'micro-organisms[,] cannot qualify as patentable
subject matter until Congress expressly authorizes such protection.'" In re Grams, 888
F.2d 835, 838 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 314). The Grams court
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terpreted the words of section 101 "'as taking their ordinary, con-
temporary, common meaning,'"21 and has avoided reading
limitations into section 101 that Congress has not expressed. 22
Generally, an invention that involves new acts or methods falls
under the section 101 category of process. 23 An invention that con-
tains physical subject matter is classified as either machine, manu-
facture, or composition of matter.24 Congress defined the term
"process" in section 100(b) as a "process, art or method" that may
include "a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, com-
position of matter, or material."' 25 This language, however, has pro-
vided courts with little guidance in determining when an invention
can be classified as a process.26
The Supreme Court provided a more helpful and complete
meaning for the term by defining a process as "an act, or a series of
acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and re-
duced to a different state or thing."' 27 This judicial definition
contemplates that a process will consist of a series of steps or opera-
tions whereby a desiredresult or effect will be produced by " 'chem-
ical action, [or] by the operation or application of some element or
power of nature, or of one substance to another.' ",28 One example
of a patentable process is the step-by-step method for molding syn-
thetic rubber, which begins with the loading of raw, uncured rubber
into a mold and ends with the eventual opening of the press at the
conclusion of the cure.29
Subject matter falls under the section 101 category of
"machine" if an aspect of the patent claim includes a "mechanical
noted that the Court's rejection of this argument in Chakrabarty seems to reflect a change
in the Court's thinking from Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), where the Court said
that it must proceed cautiously when asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly
unforeseen by Congress. Grams, 888 F.2d at 838.
21 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (quoting Perrin v. United States,
444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
22 Id.
23 PTO Report on Patentable Subject Matter: Mathematical Algorithms and Computer Pro-
grams, 38 Pat. Trademark & CopyrightJ. (BNA) No. 948, at 563 (Sept. 21, 1989) [herein-
after PTO Report].
24 Id.
25 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1988).
26 Note, Algorithm Patentability after Diamond v. Diehr, 15 IND. L. REv. 713, 714
(1982) (authored by Roland A. Fuller III).
27 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 183 (1981) (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94
U.S. 780, 788 (1877)); see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) ("Transfor-
mation and reduction of an article 'to a different state or thing' is the clue to the patenta-
bility of a process claim that does not include particular machines.").
28 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 183 n.7 (quoting Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252,
267 (1854)).
29 Id. at 184. Other examples of patentable processes include the "arts of tanning,
dyeing, making water-proof cloth .... [and] smelting ores." Id& at 183 n.7.
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device... to perform some function and produce a certain effect or
result." 30 In many instances, a claim may include a combination of
both machinery and process.3 ' However, the machinery used to
perform the process need not be new or patentable for the claim
itself to be patentable. 32 If the machine is secondary to the process
as a whole, and the process itself is patentable, then the claim recites
statutory subject matter.
35
B. Mathematical Algorithms Are Not Per Se a Statutory
Process Under Section 101
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's view that courts should
give statutory subject matter under section 101 a broad interpreta-
tion,34 courts in the past have held that natural truths are not pat-
entable.3 5 This position follows from the language of section 101.
Specifically, the use of the phrase "whoever invents" in section 101
requires that the claimed subject matter be man-made or invented,
and not merely discovered.3 6 Thus, laws of nature, scientific truths,
natural phenomena, and abstract intellectual ideas are never patent-
able.3 7 Courts have held that "[s]uch discoveries are 'manifestations
of... nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.' "38
The Supreme Court has viewed mathematical algorithms as
30 Id at 182-83 n.7.
31 Id
32 Id at 184.
33 Id.
34 See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. Despite Congress's intentionally
broad wording of section 101, courts have interpreted the language of this section nar-
rowly to insure that grants of patent protection are consistent with basic policies of the
patent system. See Note, supra note 14, at 163.
35 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978); Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); see also In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
("The Supreme Court has recognized that scientific principles and laws of nature, even
when for the first time discovered, have existed throughout time, define the relationship
of man to his environment, and, as a consequence, ought not to be the subject of exclu-
sive rights of any one person.").
36 Kahn & DeVito, supra note 15, at 8. The word "discovers" in section 101 has
been interpreted as having the same meaning as the word "invents." E. KrrCH & H.
PERLMAN, supra note 1, at 856.
37 Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853). As the Court stated in
Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948), "[i]f there is to
be [an] invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of
nature to a new and useful end." See also infra note 48 and accompanying text.
38 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co.,
333 U.S. at 130). In holding that laws of nature, scientific truths, natural phenomena,
and abstract intellectual ideas are not patentable, courts have reflected the principle that
all of society should be free to use these concepts, and to allow such patents would
suppress technological progress, contrary to article I, section 8 of the Constitution.
Note, Patentability of Computer-Related Inventions: A Criticism of the PTO's View on Algorithms,
54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 871, 884 (1986) (authored byJeffrey A. Simenauer).
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similar to laws of nature and has held that a "[mathematical] al-
gorithm, or mathematical formula... like a law of nature.., cannot
be the subject of a patent." 39 This exception applies only to mathe-
matical algorithms and not to algorithms in general.40 Any process is
an algorithm in the sense that it is a step-by-step procedure to arrive
at a given result. To extend this exception to all algorithms would
have the effect of reading "process" out of section 101.41 Thus,
only mathematical algorithms in and of themselves are excepted




THE PATENTABILrIY OF CLAIMS CONTAINING
MATHEMATICAL ALGORITHMS
A. Background: The Benson and Flook Decisions
Although mathematical algorithms themselves are nonstatutory
under section 101, courts have recognized that the presence of a
mathematical algorithm does not automatically render a process un-
patentable.43 Courts generally agree that a claim containing a math-
ematical algorithm may well satisfy the requirements of section 101
if that claim applies or implements the algorithm in a known struc-
ture or process.44
This principle evolved from the Supreme Court's decision in
39 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186.
40 PTO Report, supra note 23, at 564. The Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson
defined the term algorithm narrowly so as to include only "procedure[s] for solving a
given type of mathematical problem." 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972); see Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186
n.9; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 n.1 (1978); Application of Walter, 618 F.2d 758,
765 n.4 (C.C.P.A. 1980). Thus, courts often refer to a mathematical algorithm as an
algorithm in the Benson sense of the term. Application of Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245
(C.C.P.A. 1978).
41 Walter, 618 F.2d at 765 n.4.
42 Mathematicians for centuries have freely used mathematical algorithms in their
research. Progress in the field of mathematics is accomplished through the sharing of
ideas among mathematicians and the building on and improvement of previous re-
search. If mathematical algorithms were patentable, basic research and the free ex-
change of information would be inhibited. Mathematicians would thus be reluctant to
share their findings while awaiting a patent. Further, it would be an impossible task for
mathematicians to keep track of everyone's patented algorithms during their research.
As a practical matter, enforcing these patents would be extremely difficult. Edmund L.
Andrews, Patents on Equations: Some See a Danger, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1989, at D1, col. 4.
43 Flook, 437 U.S. at 590; see also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187 ("a claim drawn to subject
matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a math-
ematical formula"). The Diehr Court recognized that the technological application of
mathematical algorithms furthers the constitutional purpose of promoting the progress
of science and useful arts, and therefore, should be patentable in such cases. PTO Re-
port, supra note 23, at 564.
44 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187-88. As the concurring opinion in O'Reilly v. Morse, 56
U.S. (15 How.) 62, 132-33 (1853) noted:
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Gottschalk v. Benson.45 In Benson, the Court held that a method of
converting numerical information from binary-coded decimals into
pure binary numbers for use in programming digital computers was
not patentable. 46 The mathematical formula involved in the process
had no substantial application except in connection with a digital
computer. Thus, the Court reasoned that to grant protection
"would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical
effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself."47 Although the
Court based its decision on the longstanding rule that mathematical
algorithms are not patentable, the Court recognized that a patent-
able invention may evolve from the discovery of a mathematical al-
gorithm if the invention applies the algorithm "to a new and useful
end."'48 However, a process claim which contains a mathematical
formula cannot be drawn so broadly that it covers all uses of the
formula.4
9
The Benson decision is significant in that the Court focused its
inquiry on the mathematical algorithm and its connection with other
physical or mechanical processes of the invention. 50 This method of
analysis laid the framework for all subsequent section 101 analyses
of claims containing mathematical algorithms. When confronted
with determining the patentability of this type of claim, courts
generally focus on the relationship between the mathematical al-
gorithm and the other physical or mechanical steps of the claim. 51
The mere discovery of a new element, or law, or principle of nature,
without any valuable application of it to the arts, is not the subject of a
patent. But he who takes this new element or power, as yet useless, from
the laboratory of the philosopher, and makes it the servant of man; who
applies it to the perfecting of a new and useful art, or to the improvement
of one already known, is the benefactor to whom the patent law tenders
its protection.
45 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
46 Id. at 71-72.
47 Id A mathematical algorithm is preempted if its discoverer is granted "the right
to exclude others from enjoying the benefits derived from the operation" of that mathe-
matical algorithm. Id. at 65.
48 Id at 67; see also MacKay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94
(1939) ("While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not [a] patenta-
ble invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific
truth may be."); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1366 (D. Del. 1983) ("The Supreme Court and the
CCPA has [sic] clearly stated that a mathematical algorithmic formula is merely an idea
and not patentable unless there is a new application of the idea to a new and useful
end.").
49 Benson, 409 U.S. at 68.
50 Kahn & DeVito, supra note 15, at 9.
51 See infra notes 53-174 and accompanying text; see also Application of Walter, 618
F.2d 758, 765 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (decision as to whether an invention utilizing a mathe-
matical algorithm is statutory rests on the relationship of the algorithm to the remainder
of the invention's substance as claimed).
968
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However, courts differ in formulating the nature and scope of this
connection.5
2
For example, the Supreme Court in Parker v. Flook 53 broadened
the preemption approach it earlier endorsed in Benson. The Flook
Court held that a method of updating alarm limit values during cata-
lytic conversion processes did not describe patentable subject mat-
ter under section 101.1 Flook's method consisted of three steps:
measuring the present value of a process variable (e.g., tempera-
ture); calculating, via a mathematical formula, an updated alarm
limit value; and finally, adjusting the actual alarm limit to the up-
dated value.55
Even though Flook's claims did not cover every conceivable ap-
plication of the mathematical algorithm and did not preempt all
uses of the mathematical algorithm as in Benson, the Court held the
invention unpatentable.5 6 Unlike the claims in Benson, Flook's claim
included a specific end use for the process: the adjustment of the
alarm limit to the figure computed by the formula.57 While the
presence of this "post-solution activity" convinced the CCPA that
the mathematical algorithm per se was not preempted,58 the
Supreme Court rejected the notion that post-solution activity is
enough to transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable
process. 59 The Court expressed the fear that if the addition of insig-
52 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir.
1989); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Application of Walter, 618 F.2d 758
(C.C.P.A. 1980); see infra notes 66-174 and accompanying text.
53 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
54 IM. at 594-96.
55 Id. at 585-86. This method is used during catalytic conversion processes in
which operating conditions such as temperature, pressure, and flow rates must be con-
stantly monitored. When any of these process variables exceed a predetermined alarm
limit, an alarm may signal the presence of an abnormal condition indicating either ineffi-
ciency or danger. Since operating conditions are transient in many catalytic conversion
processes, alarm limits must be updated periodically. Id. at 585.
56 Id. at 586; see Kahn & DeVito, supra note 15, at 10.
57 Flook, 437 U.S. at 589-90.
58 In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 23 (C.C.P.A. 1977), rev'd, Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978). For clarification of the term "preempted," see supra note 47.
59 Flook, 437 U.S. at 590. "Insignificant post-solution activity" is activity that has no
essential role in the claimed process and is merely one of many applications of the pro-
cess's solution. Courts have generally agreed that claimed subject matter is nonstatu-
tory if the only limitation in the claim, aside from the mathematical algorithm, is
insignificant post-solution activity. In short, insignificant post-solution activity by itself
is never sufficient to constitute a statutory process. PTO Report, supra note 23, at 567; see
also In re de Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236, 1244 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (final step of transmitting
electric signal representing the result of its calculations "does not transform the claim
into one for a process merely using an algorithm"); Safe Flight Instrument Corp. v.
Sundstrand Data Control, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 1146 (D. Del. 1989) (final step of means for
processing a windshear signal to provide an indication representing the magnitude
thereof not sufficient to render claim statutory), aff'd, 899 F.2d 1228, reh'g denied, 1990
U.S. App. LEXIS 6256 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 295 (1990). A good indicator
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nificant post-solution activity makes an otherwise unpatentable
claim patentable, any competent draftsperson could turn a claim
with a mathematical algorithm into a patentable claim.60 Such a no-
tion, the Court said, "exalts form over substance."
61
The Flook Court presented a new procedure for analyzing
claims employing a mathematical algorithm. The Court interjected
issues of novelty and inventiveness into the section 101 inquiry,62
and examined the claim accordingly to determine whether it dis-
closed "some other inventive concept" besides the mathematical al-
gorithm.63 The Court found that the mathematical algorithm was
the only novel feature of Flook's process, and concluded that the
claim presented merely an improved method of calculation.64 Con-
sequently, the Court rejected Flook's patent claim.65
B. Application of Walter: The Two-Step Test
The Benson and Flook decisions left the section 101 analysis of
claims containing a mathematical algorithm in a state of extreme
that post-solution activity may be insignificant is if "the end-product of a claimed inven-
tion is a pure number." In such a case, "the invention is nonstatutory regardless of any
post-solution activity." Application of Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767-68 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
But see In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 908 n.9 (C.C.P.A. 1982) ("[T]he fact that [the] equation
is the final step is not determinative of the section 101 issue.") (citing In Re Richman,
563 F.2d 1026, 1030 (1977)).
60 Flook, 437 U.S. at 590.
61 1&.
62 The Flook dissent criticized the majority for importing the criteria of novelty and
inventiveness into the section 101 inquiry. The dissent argued that novelty and inven-
tiveness fall under section 102 and section 103 analysis, and thus play no part in the
issue of subject-matter patentability. I& at 600 (Stewart,J., dissenting); see also 1 DONALD
R. DUNNER, PATENT LAW PERSPECTWS § 1.4[3], at 1-85 (2d ed. 1989) ("Flook was partic-
ularly disturbing because of the majority's inability to distinguish between Section 101
subject matter and Section 102 and 103 requirements for the grant of patents on inven-
tions that meet the tests of novelty and nonobviousness."). The Supreme Court in Dia-
mond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), subsequently rejected the Flook Court's approach of
requiring claims to be dissected to find the point of novelty. "In determining the eligi-
bility of... [a] claimed process for patent protection under § 101 .... claims must be
considered as a whole. It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new ele-
ments and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis." Id at 188.
The Diehr Court stated that novelty is of no relevance in determining whether the sub-
ject matter of the claim falls under one of the section 101 categories. I&. at 188-89; see
supra note 17.
63 Flook, 437 U.S. at 594.
64 Id. at 594-95, 595 n.18. In Walter, 618 F.2d at 766, the court rejected the notion
that the Flook Court adopted a point of novelty approach to section 101; i.e., an inven-
tion would be nonstatutory if the mathematical algorithm in the claim is the claim's only
novel feature. The Walter court reasoned that since the Flook Court instructed that the
claim must be considered as a whole, the Court could not have adopted a point of nov-
elty approach since such an approach ignores the claim as a whole and instead concen-
trates on a single claim component. IM at 767.
65 Flook, 437 U.S. at 594.
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confusion. 66 The CCPA subsequently attempted to introduce some
concrete criteria into this analysis. In Application of Walter,6 7 the
CCPA formulated a test intended to clearly define the scope and
nature of the connection that must exist between a mathematical
algorithm and the other physical or mechanical process steps of the
claim in order to satisfy section 101 requirements.
In Walter, the claimant invented a method and apparatus for
correlating and cross-correlating signals in the field of seismic pros-
pecting and surveying.68 The invention unscrambled the returning
signals of seismic source waves which are transmitted downward
into the earth and deflected back to the earth's surface by subsurface
formations and anomalies. By studying these signals, analysts can
determine the nature of the subsurface structure of the earth. Sev-
eral mathematical operations performed the necessary correlations
and cross-correlations. 69
The PTO Board of Appeals affirmed the PTO Examiner's final
rejection of the claims. 70 The Board viewed the process steps of the
claim to be directed to the solution of a mathematical problem, and
held that granting the claims would effectively preempt7' this math-
ematical algorithm.72 Therefore, the Board concluded that the
claims were not patentable. The CCPA affirmed the PTO's rejec-
tion of Walter's claims.73 The CCPA held that all of the process
steps were part of a mathematical algorithm for performing the cor-
relation or cross-correlation of seismic signals.74 Although the
claim preamble related the invention to the practice of seismic sur-
veying, the CCPA concluded that this field of use limitation 75 did
66 See Kahn & DeVito, supra note 15, at 10.
67 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
68 IM. at 761.
69 Id. at 760-61.
70 Id- at 762 (discussing procedural history).
71 See supra note 47 for discussion of this term.
72 Walter, 618 F.2d at 762-63.
73 Id. at 760.
74 I. at 769.
75 A "field of use limitation" exists when a claim preamble attempts to specify the
application of a mathematical algorithm to a particular technological environment or
end use. Courts have held that such a limitation does not make the claim statutory. See
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978) (the preamble, while limiting the application
of the claimed method to a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of hy-
drocarbons, did not render the method statutory); Walter, 618 F.2d at 769 ("Although
the claim preambles relate the claimed invention to the art of seismic prospecting, the
claims themselves are not drawn to methods of or apparatus for seismic prospecting.");
In re de Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236, 1244 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1977) ("The potential for miscon-
struction of preamble language requires that compelling reason exist before that lan-
guage may be given weight."); cf In re Waldbaum, 559 F.2d 611, 616 n.6 (C.C.P.A.
1977) (portion of preambles referred to in method portion claims "are necessary for
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not save the daim.76 Consequently, the claims contained only a
mathematical algorithm or nonstatutory subject matter. 77
The Walter court used a two-step test to reach its holding. The
CCPA first formulated this test78 in Application of Freeman where the
court reversed the PTO's rejection of a process for typesetting al-
phanumeric information. 79 The first step of the test requires the
court to determine whether the claim recites a mathematical al-
gorithm.80 If a patent claim contains a mathematical formula or an
equation expressed in traditional mathematical symbols, it directly
recites a mathematical algorithm.8 1 A claim may indirectly recite a
mathematical algorithm by substituting prose or words for mathe-
matical symbols. 8 2 Ascertaining the existence of an algorithm is im-
portant, for a claim cannot attempt to patent a mathematical
algorithm if it does not include one.8 3
Once a court finds a mathematical algorithm, the court must
analyze the claim as a whole to determine whether it contains pat-
entable subject matter under section 101. The Freeman court stated
this second step in terms of preemption:84 "[T]he claim must be
further analyzed to ascertain whether in its entirety it wholly
preempts that algorithm." 85
The Walter court clarified this second step of the Freeman hold-
ing. To determine whether a claim preempts a mathematical al-
gorithm under Freeman, "the claim is analyzed to establish the
relationship between the [mathematical] algorithm and the physical
steps or elements of the claim."8 6 The Walter court carefully re-
completeness of the claims and are proper limitations thereto"); see also PTO Report, supra
note 23, at 567 (explaining case treatment).
76 Walter, 618 F.2d at 769.
77 Id.
78 The two-step test has been referred to by the courts as either the Freeman-Walter
test or the Walter test. Since the CCPA made its most important revisions to the test in
Application of Walter, this Note will refer to it as the Walter test.
79 Application of Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978). The subject matter of
Freeman's invention was a system for typesetting alphanumeric information, which was
especially useful in printing mathematical formulae. The system used both a computer-
based control system and a conventional phototypesetter. Id. at 1238-39. The CCPA
held that the method claims at issue did not recite either directly or indirectly mathemat-
ical calculations, formulae, or equations. Therefore, the claim contained patentable sub-
ject matter. I& at 1246.
80 Id at 1245.
81 Id at 1246.
82 Id.; see Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). As noted in Freeman, the claims
at issue in Benson did not contain a formula or equation expressed in traditional mathe-
matical symbols. Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1246. The claims as a whole, however, recited in
prose a formula for converting binary-coded decimal numbers into binary numbers.
83 Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1245.
84 Id; see supra note 47 for discussion of this term.
85 Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1245.
86 Walter, 618 F.2d at 767.
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worded the second step of the test as follows: "[i]f it appears that
the mathematical algorithm is implemented in a specific manner to
define structural relationships between the physical elements of the
claim (in apparatus claims) or to refine or limit claim steps (in pro-
cess claims), the claim being otherwise statutory,8 7 the claim passes
muster under § 101."88 If the claimed invention merely solves the
mathematical algorithm, the claim recites only an improved method
of calculation and does not contain patentable subject matter under
section 101.89 The court formulated a new standard by holding that
in such a case, the mathematical algorithm is not applied in a manner as to
define, refine, or, limit the physical process steps of the claim.90 The Walter
court stated that "no amount of post-solution activity9 ... nor.., a
preamble merely reciting the field of use9 2 of the mathematical al-
gorithm"93 will render such a claim statutory.
After applying the two-step test to the claims at issue, the Walter
court held the claims to be nonstatutory. The court first determined
that the claims clearly recited mathematical algorithms, since corre-
lation and cross-correlation are mathematical exercises which relate
two mathematical functions.94 The court then analyzed the claims
to determine whether they implemented the mathematical al-
gorithm in such a manner so as to define, refine, or limit the physical
process steps of the claims. 95 The court found that the claims were
not drawn to any process or apparatus for seismic surveying; rather,
the claims were only an improved mathematical method for inter-
preting the results of seismic prospecting.96 Thus, the mathematical
algorithm did not define, refine, or limit any physical process steps
in the claims, and the claims did not contain patentable subject mat-
ter when the mathematical algorithm was excluded. Further, the
Walter court concluded that the specific field of use recited in the
preamble did not save the claims from being nonstatutory and,
therefore, the claims failed the second step of the Walter test.97
87 A daim is "otherwise statutory" if it recites statutory subject matter when the
mathematical algorithm is excluded. See infra text accompanying notes 123-25.
88 Walter, 618 F.2d at 767 (footnote added).
89 1&
90 Id.
91 See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
92 See supra note 75.
93 Walter, 618 F.2d at 767 (footnotes added).
94 IE at 768-69.
95 See supra text accompanying note 90.
96 Walter, 618 F.2d at 769.
97 IdL; see supra note 75.
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C. Diamond v. Diehr: The Supreme Court's Implicit
Endorsement of the Walter Test
In Diamond v. Diehr,98 the United States Supreme Court implic-
itly endorsed the Walter test.99 Diehr applied for a patent on a pro-
cess for molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision
products.' 00 The rubber industry had been unsuccessful in devel-
oping a process for determining proper curing times because of the
difficulty of obtaining precise temperature measurements inside the
curing press. Diehr solved this problem by inventing a process
which constantly measured the temperature inside the mold and fed
the temperature measurements into a computer. The computer re-
peatedly recalculated the cure time with a mathematical equation.
When the cure time was calculated to be zero, the mold press auto-
matically opened. 10 '
The Court held that the curing process was patentable subject
matter even though the process included the use of a mathematical
algorithm.'0 2 The Court did not expressly use the language of the
Walter test; rather, it recited a method of analysis that was consistent
with and very similar to the analysis used in Walter.'03 The Court
stated that "when a claim recites a mathematical formula.., an in-
quiry must be made into whether the claim is seeking patent protec-
tion for that formula in the abstract."' 1 4 If such an inquiry reveals
that the claim is in effect patenting the mathematical formula, then
the claim merely recites an improved method of calculation and a
court will not accord it patent protection.' 0 5 "[T]his principle can-
not be circumvented by attempting to limit the use 10 6 of the formula
to a particular technological environment" or by including insignifi-
98 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
99 See infra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
100 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177.
101 1&2 at 177-78.
102 Id. at 185.
103 See Travis G. White & Richard T. Redano, Proprietary Rights: Patent Opportunities
for Software-Related Subject Matter, 4 THE COMPUTER LAw. 13, 14 (July 1987).
104 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191. A claim seeks patent protection for a mathematical al-
gorithm in the abstract if the claim, in effect, presents only an improved method of calcu-
lation despite reciting insignificant post-solution activity or a field of use limitation.
105 Id.
[Patent laws have been interpreted as providing protection for a tangible
thing. With respect to a process, the tangible thing requirement is satis-
fied by the transformation of an article from one state to another. A
claim reciting an improved method of calculation which includes post-
solution activity is attempting to obtain protection for an intangible that
is outside section 101. A claim for a process that is improved by the ap-
plication of such an intangible falls within section 101.
Note, supra note 26, at 729.
106 See supra note 75.
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cant post-solution activity in the claim. 10 7
"On the other hand, when a claim containing a mathematical
formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or pro-
cess which, when considered as a whole, is performing a function
which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming
or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim
satisfies the requirements of § 101."108
The Court viewed Diehr's claims as drawn to nothing more
than a process for molding rubber products, and not as an attempt
to patent a mathematical formula. 10 9 Diehr's claim sought patent
protection of the mathematical formula only in connection with all
of the other physical steps in the claimed process,11° i.e., installing
rubber in a press, dosing the mold, constantly determining the tem-
perature of the mold, constantly recalculating the cure time with a
mathematical formula and computer, and automatically opening the
press at the proper time."' Therefore, the claimed process imple-
mented the mathematical formula in a manner which defined, lim-
ited, and refined the physical, process steps."
12
In contrast, the claimants in Parker v. Flook were not seeking pat-
ent protection for a patentable process improved by the application
of the algorithm." 3 The claims in Flook merely provided a formula
for computing an updated alarm limit and did not explain how the
variables used in the formula were to be selected. Further, the
claims lacked any disclosure relating to the chemical processes at
work or the means of setting off an alarm or adjusting the alarm
unit. '1 4 The mathematical algorithim did not define, limit, or refine
any physical process steps as no physical process steps were in-
cluded in the claim. Flook's claims merely attempted to patent an
improved method of calculation." 15
D. In re Abele: A Less Restrictive Reading of the Walter Test
The CCPA in In re Abele116 reinterpreted its Walter analysis in
light of the Diehr decision.117 After Diehr, the Abele court determined
107 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-92 (footnote added); see supra note 59.
108 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192.
109 Id. at 191.
110 See supra text accompanying notes 51 & 67.
111 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
112 See supra text accompanying note 90.
113 See supra text accompanying notes 53-65.
114 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186-87.
115 Id. at 191.
116 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
117 Karl F. Milde, Jr., Life after Diamond v. Diehr: The CCPA Speaks Out on the Patenta-
bility of Computer-Related Subject Matter, 64J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 434, 442 (1982).
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that the operative language of Walter'"8 made it too difficult to pat-
ent inventions which contained mathematical algorithms.1 9 The
Abele court stated that Walter should not be read so narrowly as to
limit patentable subject matter only to claims in which a mathemati-
cal algorithm defines, limits, or refines the structural relationships
or physical process steps. 120 Instead, "Walter should be read as re-
quiring no more than that the algorithm be 'applied in any manner
to physical elements or process steps,' provided that its application
is circumscribed by more than a field of use limitation or non-essen-
tial post-solution activity."' 121 Given that this language is very simi-
lar to the language in the Walter and Diehr opinions, it is not literally
inconsistent with either decision.' 22
The Abele court, however, in the next sentence of its opinion,
eased the requirements of the second step of the Walter test. The
court explained that this second step required that courts view the
claim without the mathematical algorithm.123 If no statutory subject
matter remains, then the claim merely defines a mathematical al-
gorithm and the claim as a whole is nonstatutory.124 On the other
hand, if statutory subject matter remains, then the presence of the
mathematical algorithm will not render the otherwise statutory
claim nonstatutory.125 Such a relaxed reading of the second step of
the Walter test is inconsistent with the operative language in
Walter.126
In effect, the Abele court's intepretation of the Walter test's sec-
ond step discards the requirement that the mathematical algorithm
exist in such a relationship with the physical process steps of the
claim so as to limit or refine them. Instead, the Abele court's new
standard concentrates entirely on the patentability of the physical
process steps which remain in the claim after the removal of the
mathematical algorithm. 127 This new standard is distinguishable
from the Walter test's second step. 128 Although the second step in
118 See supra text accompanying note 90.
119 Abele, 684 F.2d at 907.
120 Id at 907.
121 Id (quoting In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767 (C.C.P.A. 1980)).
122 See supra text accompanying notes 86-97, 104-08.
123 Abele, 684 F.2d at 907.
124 Id at 908.
125 Id at 907. The court stated that the claim presents statutory subject matter even
if the subject matter is inoperative or less useful without the mathematical algorithm.
126 See supra text accompanying note 90.
127 See supra text accompanying notes 121-25.
128 This new standard is also inconsistent with the Diehr decision. First, the Diehr
Court required that the claims be considered as a whole and not dissected into old and
new elements. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981). The Abele standard re-
quires the claim to be dissected and then analyzed without the mathematical algorithm
for determining whether it is statutory. This conflicts with the Diehr principle. Second,
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Walter clearly requires that the mathematical algorithm be applied to
otherwise statutory physical process steps, 129 the Walter court took
its analysis a step further. The court required that the mathematical
algorithm define, refine, or limit the physical process steps of the
claim.130 Walter thereby created a standard which clearly defines
when a claim recites a statutory process, and when it merely seeks
patent protection for the mathematical algorithm itself.
131
In not requiring this additional step, the Abele court focused its
analysis entirely on the question of whether the claim is otherwise
statutory.'3 2 Such an analysis is in sharp contrast with the Walter
court's approach, which emphasized the relationship between the
mathematical algorithm and the physical process steps of the
claim.133 The Federal Circuit in In re Grams'34 finally reconciled
these two distinct approaches. As Grams illustrates, some connec-
tion between the mathematical algorithm and the physical process





Grams's invention involved a method of testing a complex sys-
tem to determine whether a system condition was normal or abnor-
mal. If abnormal, the invention provided a method of diagnosing
the cause of the abnormality.13 6 Although the method was applica-
ble to any complex system, whether it be electrical, mechanical,
the Diehr Court concluded that "a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory
does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula." l at
187. This conclusion, however, is very different from the Abele standard. The Diehr
opinion nowhere stated that a claim which is statutory without the mathematical al-
gorithm remains statutory when the algorithm is included.
129 See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
130 Walter, 618 F.2d at 767.
131 See supra text accompanying notes 86-93.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 120-2 1. The Abele court did require that the
mathematical algorithm be applied to the physical process steps of the claim. Abele, 684
F.2d at 907. Therefore, the Abele court did not go so far as to state that a claim contain-
ing a mathematical algorithm could be made statutory by including in the claim any
number of statutory physical process steps. Rather, the Abele court required that the
algorithm and physical process steps at least be somehow related. See supra text accom-
panying note 121. By contrast, the Walter court's standard was much stricter in that it
required the mathematical algorithm to define, refine, or limit the physical process steps
of the claim. Walter, 618 F.2d at 767.
133 See supra text accompanying notes 86-93.
134 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
135 See infra notes 143-56 and accompanying text.
136 Grams, 888 F.2d at 836.
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chemical, biological, or combinations thereof, the claims limited the
method to the diagnosis of a person. 3 7 The first step of Grams's
claim,' 38 step [a], required the performance of clinical laboratory
tests on an individual to obtain data for the method paramaters. 13 9
The remaining steps, steps [b] through [e], analyzed that data to
ascertain the existence and identity of an abnormality and its possi-
ble causes.'
40
The Patent Examiner rejected Grams's claim on the ground
that the method was nonstatutory subject matter. 141 On administra-
tive appeal, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences upheld
the Examiner's decision.142
B. The Reconciliation of Walter and Abele
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's holding
that the claim was drawn to a mathematical algorithm and was there-
fore nonstatutory under section 101.143 In reaching its decision, the
court adopted language from the Abele opinion, but restricted its
scope to that which the Walter court originally intended.
The Grams court determined that the claim easily satisfied the
first step of the Walter test: "[S]teps [b]-[e] are in essence a mathe-
matical algorithm, in that they represent '[a] procedure for solving a
given type of mathematical algorithm.' ,,144 The Grams court then
sought to determine whether the claim at issue contained statutory
subject matter.
Significantly, the Grams court interpreted the standard set forth
in Abele145 as consistent with the second step of the Walter test.'
46
The Grams court did not construe Abele as "declaring patentable any
claim that is statutory without the algorithm."' 147 Instead, it inter-
preted the language of Abele as "requiring... not only that the phys-
ical steps in the claim (without the algorithm) constitute a statutory
process but, also, that the algorithm operates on a claimed physical
137 Id.
138 Because all of the additional claims in the patent application depended on claim
1, it was the only one the court examined.
139 Id. at 837.
140 I&
141 Id at 835, 841.
142 Id. at 835.
143 Id. at 841.
144 Id. at 837 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972)). The appli-
cants in Grams did not, in fact, dispute that claim 1 included a mathematical algorithm.
Id.
145 See supra text accompanying notes 120-25.
146 Grams, 888 F.2d at 839 n.4.
147 Id.
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step."'148 Thus, under this interpretation, the court divided the sec-
ond step of the Walter test into two distinct inquiries: (1) Does the
claim, absent the mathematical algorithm, contain patentable sub-
ject matter?; 149 and (2) Does the mathematical algorithm "operate
on a claimed physical step"? 150
This interpretation of the second step of the Walter test is con-
sistent with the Walter decision. The Grams court's requirement that
the mathematical algorithm operate on a claimed physical process
step is equivalent to the Walter requirement that the mathematical
algorithm define, refine, or limit the physical process steps of the
claim. 151 Under this requirement, a connection or relationship be-
tween the mathematical algorithm and the physical process steps
must exist in order for the claim as a whole to be statutory.
152
Applying its interpretation of the second step of the Walter test
to the claim at issue, the Grams court determined that algorithm
steps [b] through [e] did not operate to change any aspect of the
physical process of step [a]. 153 In addition, the Grams court found
that step [a] merely provided data for the mathematical algorithm,
and held that such a data gathering process was not statutory sub-
ject matter under section 101.15 The court explained that since all
mathematical algorithms require the substitution of values for the
variables expressed in the algorithm, the establishment and substi-
148 Id
149 Id at 839.
150 Id at 839 nA.
151 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. The Grams court demonstrated its
adoption of the Walter test in its analysis of the sixth claim in the Abele case. In Abele the
court viewed the claim without the algorithm and determined that the physical process
steps which remained constituted patentable subject matter. Abele, 684 F.2d at 908. The
Abele court concluded that the claim was patentable under section 101 not because the
algorithm refined or limited the physical process steps of the claim, but because the
appellants discovered "an application of an algorithm to process steps which are them-
selves part of an overall process which is statutory." Id at 909. The Grams court agreed
that the Abele daim recited patentable subject matter, but emphasized the importance of
the Walter test in making this determination. Grams, 888 F.2d at 840. The Grams court
stated that the algorithm inAbele satisfied the Walter guideline of "refining a process step
in a process that is otherwise statutory." Id Therefore, the claim as a whole was
patentable.
152 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
153 Grams, 888 F.2d at 840.
154 Id at 839; see also In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1973) ("Given
that the method of solving a mathematical equation may not be the subject of patent
protection, it follows that the addition of the old and necessary antecedent steps of es-
tablishing values for the variables in the equation cannot convert the unpatentable
method to patentable subject matter."). The Grams court, however, fell short of con-
cluding that section 101 precludes patentability in every case where the physical step of
obtaining data is the only other significant element in a claim containing a mathematical
algorithm. Grams, 888 F.2d at 840. Rather, the claim as a whole and the circumstances
surrounding the claim must contribute, in each case, to this determination. Id
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tution of values is nothing more than a mathematical step.1 55 " 'If
the steps of gathering and substituting values were alone sufficient,
every mathematical equation, formula, or algorithm having any
practical use would be per se subject to patenting as a "process"
under [section] 101.'- 156 Since the claim, absent the mathematical
algorithm, did not contain statutory subject matter and the mathe-
matical algorithm did not operate on a claimed physical step, the
claim as a whole was nonstatutory.
C. The Grams Court Retreats
Although the Grams court appeared ready to adopt the Walter
standard in its entirety, it ultimately declined to do so. The Grams
court stated that although satisfaction of the Walter test indicates
that the claim recites statutory subject matter, failure to meet that
test is not dispositive of whether the claim is patentable. 57 Accord-
ing to the Grams court, the final analysis under section 101 requires
evaluation of the claimed invention as a whole in order to answer
the question, "'[wihat did applicants invent?' "158 This analysis re-
quires "'careful interpretation of each claim in light of its support-
ing disclosure.' "159
The question "[w]hat did applicants invent?" was originally
posed in Abele.' 60 The Abele court stated that the goal and purpose
of the two-step analysis was to answer this critical question.16 ' "If
the claimed invention is a mathematical algorithm, it is improper
subject matter for patent protection, whereas if the claimed inven-
tion is an application of the algorithm, § 101 will not bar the grant
of a patent."' 6 2 Therefore, the Abele court concluded that its pro-
posed two-step analysis was consistent with the ultimate purpose of
the analysis.
The Grams court misinterpreted this part of the Abele decision,
however. According to the Grams court, even if a claimed invention
is not found to satisfy the requirements of the Walter test, the inven-
tion is not necessarily unpatentable.' 63 The court must ultimately
answer the dispositive question, "[w]hat did applicants invent?," to
determine whether the invention is patentable. 64 The Abele court,
155 Grams, 888 F.2d at 839.
156 Id (quoting In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 1335 (C.G.P.A. 1978)).
157 Id
158 Id. (quoting In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
159 Id (quoting Abe/e, 684 F.2d at 907).
160 Abele, 684 F.2d at 907.
161 Id
162 Id




however, did not pose the question as an additional step in its analy-
sis. Rather, answering the question is merely the goal of its two-step
analysis.' 65
The Grams court's adoption of this additional step is clearly
troublesome. The court did not explain what objective criteria
should be used in order to determine what the applicants invent; it
only stated that such "analysis can be difficult."' 66 After Grams,
courts are left to make their own subjective determinations of what
the applicants invented. The Grams court stated that this determina-
tion "is facilitated somewhat if... the only physical step involves
merely gathering data for the algorithm."' 67 The court concluded
that Grams's claimed invention as a whole was a mathematical al-
gorithm since the only physical process step of the claim involved
gathering data for a mathematical algorithm.' 68 Therefore, the in-
vention was unpatentable.
D. The Test Stated in Walter Must Be the Standard
The Grams court was wise to adopt a clear and concrete test to
determine when claims containing mathematical algorithms are stat-
utory. According to the court, a claim that meets the Walter test
necessarily depicts statutory subject matter.1 69 The Grams court,
however, should have also made the Walter test the final determinant
of when claims containing mathematical algorithms are unpatent-
able. By requiring courts and patent examiners to answer the addi-
tional question, "[w]hat did applicants invent?," the Grams court
implicitly questions the effectiveness of the Walter test. A test that
successfully determines when a claim is statutory should also be able
to successfully determine when that claim is nonstatutory. There-
fore, failure of the Walter test should render a claim nonstatutory
and no further analysis should be necessary.
By holding that the final analysis requires careful interpretation
of the claims to determine what the applicant invented, the Grams
court left the ultimate determination of whether a claim is nonstatu-
tory to the subjective discretion of the PTO and the courts. In so
doing, the Grams court implied that this analysis should be con-
ducted on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the determination of whether
the claimed process was an improved method of calculation or a
statutory invention would be within the reviewing body's sole
discretion.
165 Abele, 684 F.2d at 907.
166 Grams, 888 F.2d at 839.
167 Id
168 Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 153-56.
169 Grams, 888 F.2d at 839.
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Such an approach may produce consistent decisions from case
to case in the Federal Circuit. Since the Federal Circuit is the only
appellate court that reviews PTO-rejected patent applications and
infringement actions brought in the district courts, one would ex-
pect its decisions to be consistent with its precedents.' 70 The dis-
cretionary standard of Grams, however, will probably result in
uncertain and inconsistent decisions in the PTO. The Grams deci-
sion leaves PTO examiners with no clear and straightforward
standard with which to determine when claims that contain mathe-
matical algorithms are nonstatutory. Grams provides the PTO with
neither guidelines nor rules to follow when confronted with the
question "[w]hat did applicants invent?"'71 Therefore, the ultimate
decision of whether such claims are nonstatutory will be left to the
subjective discretion of each examiner.
To minimize the likelihood of inconsistent decisions, the Grams
court should have provided lower courts and the PTO with a more
concrete and objective standard for analyzing claims containing
mathematical algorithms. The second step of the Walter test, as
originally formulated, provides such a standard and would likely
achieve the correct result in most cases. By first asking whether the
claim contains statutory subject matter without the algorithm, and
then looking at the connection between the mathematical algorithm
and the physical process steps of a claim, the second step of the
Walter test effectively decides whether the claim as a whole contains
only a mathematical algorithm and is thus nonstatutory. 172 As
stated by the court in Abele, the purpose of the two-part analysis is to
determine what the applicants have invented. 173 Therefore, this
second step answers the critical question "[wihat did applicants in-
vent?" Unlike the test adopted in Grams, the Walter test provides a
standard that can answer this question objectively: "[Is the mathe-
matical algorithm] implemented in a specific manner to define struc-
tural relationships between the physical elements (in apparatus
claims) or to refine or limit claim steps (in process claims)?"' 174 In
addition to providing courts and the PTO with clear and simple
guidelines, this standard would ultimately result in fair and correct
170 See supra notes I & 9.
171 See supra text accompanying note 166.
172 See supra text accompanying notes 87-88. The Walter test heeds the principle that
insignificant post-solution activity, field of use limitations, and data gathering steps are
never sufficient to constitute a statutory process. See supra notes 91-93, 154 and accom-
panying text.
173 In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907 (C.C.P.A. 1982); see supra text accompanying notes
160-62.




determinations of when claims with mathematical algorithms con-
tain patentable subject matter.
IV
CONCLUSION
Following the Abele decision in 1982 and the PTO's adoption of
the Abele court's broad interpretation of the Walter test, universities
and corporations flooded the PTO with patent applications for in-
ventions which contained mathematical algorithms.' 75 The PTO
awarded patents to many of these inventions despite the fact that
the mathematical algorithm constituted the heart of the claim and
the claim described only general applications of the algorithm. 176
Mathematicians quickly grew concerned that the courts' and the
PTO's new liberal attitude toward mathematical algorithm patenta-
bility could erode the historical principle that mathematical algo-
rithms by themselves cannot be patented. 177 The Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit in Grams apparently paid heed to ihis con-
cern. By adopting the Walter test, the court emphasized that a math-
ematical algorithm must exist in a special relationship with the
physical process steps of the claim in order for the claimed inven-
tion as a whole to contain patentable subject matter under section
101. However, the court only adopted the Walter test to determine
when a claimed invention is statutory. According to the court, fail-
ure of the Walter test is not dispositive of whether a claimed inven-
tion is nonstatutory. Rather, courts must engage in a further step of
analysis by determining, "[w]hat did applicants invent?" If the
claimed invention is merely a mathematical algorithm, it is unpat-
entable. If the claimed invention is an application of the algorithm,
however, it is patentable subject matter. Unfortunately, the Grams
court did not provide any objective criteria for courts or the PTO to
use in making this determination. Thus, an increasingly significant
aspect of section 101 analysis is left with a subjective and unclear
standard. This uncertainty requires correction. Complete applica-
tion of the Walter test provides the remedy.
Jeffrey . Ryen
175 Andrews, supra note 42.
176 Id. at D6, col. 1.
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